A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship
RichardL. Reveszj'
Lee Epstein and Gary King, two distinguished social scientists,
mount a forceful attack on empirical legal scholarship.' According to
Epstein and King, "the current state of empirical legal scholarship is
deeply flawed" and has "little awareness of, much less compliance
with, the rules of inference that guide empirical research in the social
and natural sciences."2 They characterize this problem as universal:
[In deciding whether to write this Article, we conducted our own
survey of current practices in the nation's law reviews. Our purpose
was to identify where the problems were. Our answer? Everywhere.
We find that serious problems of inference and methodology
abound everywhere we find empirical research in the law
reviews
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Moreover, Epstein and King maintain that empirical legal scholarship does not pay attention to methodological issues: "The sustained, self-conscious attention to the methodology of empirical
analysis so present in the journals in traditional academic fields ... is

virtually nonexistent in the nation's law reviews.'"4 This problem, they
believe, is also universal: "[T]he complete list of all law review articles
devoted to improving, understanding, explicating, or adapting the
rules of inference is as follows: none."5
Epstein and King's solution is to place empirical legal scholarship
in a type of intellectual receivership, in which law professors get sent
to the functional equivalent of a reeducation camp.6 Here, they will be
required to follow the precepts set forth by Epstein and King and receive remedial instruction from social scientists. According to Epstein
and King: "Learning and understanding the rules we discuss in this
Article are, we believe, necessary steps for law professors to take. Yet,
t
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at the same time, we acknowledge that these steps alone are insufficient, and that legal academics will require additional training to implement the rules we have offered. 7 Epstein and King think that the
consequences of not taking their work seriously will be dire: empirical
legal scholarship will remain deeply flawed "if th[eir] Article is not
read."8
In the past twenty years, the legal academy has become quite interdisciplinary in its ambitions and methods. It is therefore natural
that scholars in other disciplines-particularly the social scienceswould want to assess the quality of work being done by legal scholars,
as Epstein and King have done. At the same time, given the extent to
which joint degree holders and otherwise academically trained individuals have moved into legal teaching, it would be surprising if the
quality of legal research-particularly empirical research-had not
improved dramatically over time, with its tools becoming more sophisticated, the questions it addresses becoming better conceived, and its
results becoming more illuminating. Surprisingly, after engaging in
what they take to be an exhaustive review of the literature, Epstein
and King conclude that the results are grim. As already indicated, they
find much to condemn and little to applaud in the current scholarly
output of legal academics performing empirical work.
This brief response proceeds as follows. Parts I and II focus on
my work on judicial behavior in the D.C. Circuit,9 which Epstein and
King criticize as an example of flawed empirical scholarship.0 In Part
I, I present my D.C. Circuit article as a case study of various categories
of methodological advances achieved by empirical legal scholars, and
suggest that similar methodological advances can be found elsewhere
in legal scholarship. In Part II, I show that Epstein and King's specific
criticisms of my D.C. Circuit work are all unwarranted, and raise questions as to whether mine could be the only example of empirical legal
scholarship that they attack in an unjustified manner. Part III criticizes
the methodology used by Epstein and King to conclude that the benefits of methodological interactions between social scientists and lawyers are all unidirectional-from the social scientists to the lawyers.
Part IV takes issue with Epstein and King's portrayal of empirical legal scholarship as disconnected from developments elsewhere in the
academy.
The Epstein and King article defines empirical legal scholarship
very broadly, in a way that encompasses a great deal of legal scholarId at 119.
Id at 116 n 41.
9 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C Circuit, 83 Va L
Rev 1717 (1997).
10 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 74-75, 83-85 (cited in note 1).
7
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ship." My comment is much narrower. It focuses on econometric
analyses, and its examples are drawn primarily from studies of judicial
behavior. Thus, it does not deal with other important questions raised
by Epstein and King, such as whether legal history should be subjected to the methodological standards of the social sciences rather
than to the methodological standards of historical research. 'z
The opening of a dialogue between legal scholars and social scientists has been an extremely salutary academic development of the
past decades. 3 The Epstein and King article, with its one-sided criticisms-some clearly unwarranted-threatens to undermine this dialogue. Moreover, in their haste to show that legal academics have
failed, Epstein and King miss an important opportunity to explore the
ways in which each discipline can contribute to the other. In contrast, I
hope that this Response can be a catalyst for useful interdisciplinary
interactions.
I. METHODOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Epstein and King state in no uncertain terms that empirical legal
scholarship is wholly unconcerned with questions of methodology, and
that no law review article-not a single one-is concerned with4
"understanding, explicating, or adapting the rules of inference."'
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the sweeping and incautious nature of
their claim, the authors are simply wrong.
I will begin by discussing three important methodological innovations contained in my own empirical study of the D.C. Circuit's treatment of challenges to health and safety regulation." Because the authors chose to criticize my article at some length, they must believe
that, like all the rest of empirical legal scholarship, it fails to give "sustained, self-conscious attention to the methodology of empirical
analysis."'7

11 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 2-3 (cited in note 1) ("What makes research
empirical is that it is based on observations of the world ....
These facts may be historical or contemporary, based on legislation or case law, the results of interviews or surveys, or the outcomes
of secondary archival research or primary data collection."). They add that "in terms of legal
scholarship, it is only the purely normative or theoretical that is not empirical." Id at 3.
12 See id at 42,97-99.
13 For a useful effort of this type, see Frank B. Cross, PoliticalScience and the New Legal
Realism:A Case of Unfortunate InterdisciplinaryIgnorance,92 Nw U L Rev 251 (1997) (urging
combination of the political science attitudinal model with legal models in evaluating judicial decisionmaking).
14 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 11 (cited in note 1).
15 Revesz, 83 Va L Rev 1717 (cited in note 9).
16 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 74-75,83-85 (cited in note 1).
17 See id at 6.
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A. Priest-Klein Effects
First, my study of the D.C. Circuit pays close attention to the possibility that changes in the ideological composition of a court will have
effects on the mix of cases presented to that court for litigation.18 Assume, for example, that the composition of a court shifts over time
from being predominantly composed of Republican-appointed judges
to being predominantly composed of Democrat-appointed judges.
(For expository simplicity, judges appointed by Democratic presidents
will be referred to as Democratic judges, and judges appointed by Republican presidents will be referred to as Republican judges.)
Let us also assume that Republican judges are more likely than
Democratic judges to vote in favor of industry groups challenging environmental regulation as too stringent. Conversely, let us assume that
Democratic judges are more likely than their Republican counterparts
to vote in favor of environmental groups challenging environmental
regulation as too lax. What are the consequences for the types of cases
litigated before the court if the composition shifts from a majorityDemocratic composition in Time 0 to a majority-Republican composition in Time 1?
One consequence might be that industry groups would pursue
weaker cases at Time 1 than at Time 0 because, holding constant the
quality of the case, they have a greater probability of prevailing. Thus,
cases that would not have been worth bringing in Time 0, given their
expected payoff and the cost of litigation, are worth bringing in Time
1. The proportion of cases in which industry groups prevail might not
change over time, because the higher probability of success that results from the more sympathetic panels is counteracted by the lower
probability of success that results from the lesser average quality of
the cases they litigate. 19
The rightward shift of the judges also has an effect on settlements.
Under the model developed in the influential article by George Priest
and Benjamin Klein, cases with either very high or very low probabilities of success are likely to be settled rather than litigated.20 The model
predicts that the litigated cases would be less clear-cut; under certain
relatively restrictive conditions, in fact, in the universe of litigated
Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1721-27 (cited in note 9).
19 See Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the FederalAppellate Courts: Impact
of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J Legal Stud 685, 707-08
18

(2000).

20
See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J
Legal Stud 1, 15 (1984) (demonstrating that "closer" cases have a wider variance in the parties'
estimation of plaintiffs chances for victory and thus are more likely to be litigated). In such
cases, the parties are likely to differ less in their estimates of the plaintiff's (or appellant's) probability of success. See id.
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cases, the probability that plaintiffs prevail is 50 percent regardless of
the composition of the court.2' Under the predictions made by the
Priest-Klein model, the rightward shift in the votes of judges changes
the mix of litigated cases but not the probability that plaintiffs will
prevail."
These case-selection effects create difficulties for the design of
empirical studies that seek to determine whether the votes of judges
are influenced by their ideologies. In the preceding example, if the
proxy used for a judge's ideology were the views generally held by the
party of the appointing president, one would expect that the court
would be more sympathetic to industry challenges at Time 1 than at
Time 0. Were it not for case-selection effects, one would expect that
the industry groups would prevail in a greater proportion of the cases
at Time 1. But, as explained above, such an effect might not be observed even if judges vote consistent with their ideology because the
change in the composition of the court also affects the mix of litigated
cases.
Thus, any empirical technique that does not control for caseselection effects is biased against finding evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that judges vote ideologically. The social science literature
on judicial politics largely overlooks this complication; it simply aggregates voting records over time without controlling for possible
changes in the mix of cases reaching the court.n This problem is most
serious with studies that aggregate cases over long periods of time.2
Similar shortcomings are reflected in recent efforts in social science literature to test the hypothesis derived from positive political
theory models in which judges vote in an ideologically "strategic"
manner, so that they compromise their true preferences to the extent
21 See id at 4-6. For explanations of the circumstances under which the plaintiff's probability of success can deviate from 50 percent, see id at 24-29. See also Daniel Kessler, Thomas
Meites, and Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviationsfrom the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal
Approach to the Selection of Casesfor Litigation, 25 J Legal Stud 233 (1996) (classifying cases by
characteristics and correcting for "multimodal" case characteristics in order to explain plaintiffs'

lower than 50 percent success rates); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of PlaintiffVictory at TrialIs
Possible,25 J Legal Stud 493 (1996) (attacking the theory that the litigated plaintiff success rate
should be 50 percent).
22 Revesz, 29 J Legal Stud at 707 (cited in note 19).
2 See, for example, Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts ofAp-

peals Revisited, 69 Am Polit Sci Rev 491, 491-93 (1975) (examining nonunanimous appellate
court decisions from 1965 to 1971 without correcting for the change in case selection); C. Neal
Tate, PersonalAttributeModels of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices:Liberalism
in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions,1946-1978,75 Am Polit Sci Rev 355 (1981) (using an

attitudinal model in analyzing Supreme Court decisions without correcting for case-selection effects).
24 For one prominent example, see Robert A. Carp and C.K. Rowland, Policymaking and
Politicsin the FederalDistrict Courts 14 (Tennessee 1983) (aggregating cases over a forty-four-

year period).
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necessary to avoid legislative reversal.' If judges vote strategically in
this manner, a legislative shift to the right would lead to a judicial shift
to the right. But, as a result of case-selection effects, industry groups
might not win a larger proportion of the cases they litigate. Any empirical technique that looked at the impact of the legislative shift on
the success rate of such groups would be biased against finding evidence of strategic voting if it did not control for case-selection effects.6
In contrast, in my D.C. Circuit piece, I avoided the Priest-Klein
problem by dividing the full universe of cases into subsamples defined
by time periods during which the composition of the court was relatively stable. For each such period, the interparty comparison was restricted to the judges who served for the full period.2 Because cases
are assigned randomly to panels, ideological voting would result in interparty differences in judicial votes.
To illustrate the problem that would arise if the judicial votes
were instead analyzed in a single sample, assume, counterfactually,
that the court was predominantly Republican in the 1970s and predominantly Democratic in the 1980s. In this scenario, the Republican
judges decide a disproportionate number of the cases filed in the
1970s whereas the Democratic judges decide a disproportionate number of the cases filed in the 1980s. Assume further that aggregating the
votes of all the judges across all cases decided since 1970 reveals that
Republicans are no more likely than Democrats to reverse EPA regulations when the challenger is an industry group. One simply cannot
tell from such a statistic whether the same interparty relationship
would have been observed if the Republicans and Democrats had decided the same set of cases.
More recently, in an article designed to test whether the ideological voting on the D.C. Circuit is strategic,7 I devised a methodology to
control for the effects of case selection when testing for evidence of
strategic voting. The standard technique in the political science litera25 See, for example, Tony Caporale and Harold Winter, PoliticalInfluence over Supreme
Court Criminal Procedure Cases, 35 J Econ Beh & Org 465, 466-67 (1998) (using court cases

over a forty-year time period without correcting for case-selection effects); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory of Congressand the Courts, 91 Am Polit Sci
Rev 28,29 (1997) (describing the attitudinal model without mentioning possible bias due to caseselection effects); Pablo T. Spiller and Rafael Gely, CongressionalControl or Judicial Independence: The Determinantsof US Supreme CourtLabor-Relations Decisions,1949-1988,23 RAND J
Econ 463, 478-79 (1990) (acknowledging the possibility of case-selection effects but asserting
that the problem is not serious in their sample, and making no attempt to correct for it).
26
I explore the issue at some length in Richard L. Revesz, CongressionalInfluence on Judicial Behavior?:An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit,
76 NYU L Rev 1100,1116-19 (2001).
27
See Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1721-27 (cited in note 9).
28 See Revesz, 76 NYU L Rev at 1122-27 (cited in note 26). The article has been available
online at <http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=271932> since June 2,2001.
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ture has been to look at how changes in Congress affect the proportion of litigated cases in which a judge rules for a particular type of
outcome.2 But, as already explained, even if judges vote strategically,
the shift caused by congressional changes would be counteracted by
case-selection effects, so that no differences in voting patterns might
be observed.'
Instead of following the standard technique used in the political
science literature, I focused on how the interparty difference between
the votes of Democratic and Republican judges is affected by changes
in the control of the two houses of Congress. In particular, when the
two houses of Congress are under divided control, Democratic and
Republican judges can vote consistent with their ideologies with less
fear of legislative reversal than when the two chambers are under the
unified control of one party. Thus, if judges vote strategically, one
would expect the interparty voting differences to be greater when
Congress is under divided control than when it is under unified control.'
This effect is impervious to changes in the mix of cases reaching
the courts. Regardless of whether the average quality of litigated cases
is relatively stronger or relatively weaker, strategic judges should be
expected to be more restrained in voting consistent with their ideologies when the probability of legislative reversal is higher.
My efforts to control for case-selection effects build upon both
empirical examinations of the Priest-Klein effect' and a relatively extensive theoretical literature by legal scholars. The possibility of caseselection effects is well understood by economically minded legal
scholars. It is therefore not surprising that the empirical legal literature, with which Epstein and King find so much fault, developed
methodological innovations to address this problem.
B.

Panel Composition Effects

My work on judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit pays
close attention to the possibility that a judge's vote on a case will be
affected by the identity of the remaining judges on a panel.33fThus, the
estimations contain a colleague variable, which is 1 if a judge has at
least one colleague of the same party on the panel, and 0 otherwise.1
Controlling for the composition of the panel is necessary to test the

30

See text accompanying notes 39,83-84.
See text accompanying notes 25-26.

31

See Revesz, 76 NYU L Rev at 1116 (cited in note 26).

32

See Kessler, Meites, and Miller, 25 J Legal Stud 233 (cited in note 21).
See Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1732-34 (cited in note 9).
See id at 1757. 1 also followed this approach in Revesz, 76 NYU L Rev at 1124 (cited in
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phenomenon that Judge Posner has termed "go-along voting"-the
practice of not dissenting in cases in which a judge's views are inconsistent with those of the panel majority."
My work has shown the importance of paying attention to panel
composition effects. A judge's vote on the D.C. Circuit is significantly
affected by whether she has at least one colleague of the same party
on the panel.3 Indeed, I found that "Democratic judges 'vote as Democrats' only when there are at least two Democrats on the panel,
and that, similarly, Republican judges 'vote as Republicans' only when
there are at least two Republicans on the panel." 37
The political science literature has not paid attention to this issue.
Studies of the Supreme Court do not control for the possibility that a
justice's votes will be affected by the changing identity of her colleagues over time; more pertinently, studies of the courts of appeals do
not control for the composition of particular panels.M This failure has
an important negative consequence: it leads to an understatement of
the true nature of the ideological divisions on the court. Consider a
situation in which a court of appeals that hears cases in three-judge
panels chosen at random is evenly divided between Democratic and
Republican judges. This hypothetical court is extremely polarized
along party lines: industry-groups always prevail before majorityRepublican panels but never prevail before majority-Democratic panels. The judges, however, engage in "go-along voting," so that they
never dissent. An empirical study that did not control for the composition of the panel would find no interparty voting differences at all: in
randomly assigned panels, Democratic and Republican judges would
each vote in favor of the industry's claim in exactly half the cases.
In contrast, an empirical study, like mine, that contained an independent variable for panel composition would find that a Republican
judge votes in favor of the industry's claim 100 percent of the time
when she has at least one Republican colleague, and 0 percent of the
time otherwise. In contrast, a Democratic judge votes in favor of the
industry's claim 100 percent of the time when she is the sole Democrat
on the panel and 0 percent of the time otherwise. The methodology
generally used in the political science literature would miss this evidence of ideological voting.
35
See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S Ct Econ Rev 1, 2, 20 (1993) (stating that "go-along voting" maximizes
judges' leisure).
36
See Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1751-56,1759-60 (cited in note 9).
37 Id at 1766. For a more recent article (also criticized by Epstein and King) examining the
effects of panel composition on the D.C. Circuit, see Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine:Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts ofAppeals, 107 Yale L J 2155,2173-75 (1998).
38 See, for example, sources cited in notes 23, 25.
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Again, it is not surprising that legal academics would make a
methodological innovation of this sort. Legal scholars clearly have a
comparative advantage in understanding the inner workings of the judiciary. More importantly, a large proportion of legal scholars, but virtually no social science scholars, have spent a year or more as judicial
clerks, working closely with a judge and being in a position to observe
the nature of inter-judge interactions.
C. Attention to the Nature of Legal Arguments
Empirical legal scholarship also pays attention to the nature of
the legal arguments presented to the court. In contrast, what matters
for the social science scholars is the relief sought by the parties: a
more liberal or conservative outcome39
In my D.C. Circuit study, I tested whether the type of argumentstatutory or procedural-presented to the court affected the nature of
the ideological divisions among the judges. The results were stark. Between 1986 and 1994, following the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA Inc v NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc,' there were no

statistically significant differences in the way in which Democrats and
Republicans voted on issues of statutory interpretation. In contrast,
for industry challenges, the differences were highly significant with respect to procedural issues. Indeed, for procedural claims, the probability of reversal of the agency decision ranged from 2 percent to 13 percent for panels with two Democrats and one Republican, but ranged
from 54 percent to 89 percent for panels with two Republicans and
one Democrat. These stark differences would not have been revealed
if I had not used an independent variable controlling for the nature of
the argument. 1
The possible constraining effects of law are taken far more seriously in law schools than in social science departments. In part, legal
scholarship has evolved out of a legal formalist tradition, which believes that judicial decisions are determined by precedent and are unaffected by a judge's policy preferences.4 2 In contrast, the social science
39 See, for example, sources cited in notes 23,25; text accompanying notes 83-84.An influential book by prominent political scientists describes its methodology as follows: "[W]e may
properly speak of a case outcome, as well as a justice's vote, as 'liberal' or 'conservative.' ... For
the most part, our specification of the 'liberal' and 'conservative' positions accords with common
usage." Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold I Spaeth, The Supreme Courtand the AttitudinalModel 243

(Cambridge 1993).
40 467 US 837 (1984).
41

See Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1729-32 (cited in note 9); Revesz, 76 NYU L Rev at 1107

(cited in note 26). For an unpublished manuscript examining whether the reasoning in judicial
opinions is motivated by strategic considerations, see Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The
Strategy ofJudging:Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J Legal Stud (forthcoming 2002).
42 See John Ferejohn, Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory, in Jeffery S. Banks

The University of Chicago Law Review

[69:169

literature on judicial behavior has been generally uninterested in the
role of legal argument, which does not play an important role in either

of the leading political science models: the attitudinal model, which
posits that judges vote sincerely in accordance with their policy pref-

erences, and the strategic model, in which judges are willing to compromise their ideological preferences in order to avoid legislative reversal.'
D.

Generalizing the Claim

I have provided some examples of how my work on the D.C. Circuit extends the methodology used in studies of judicial behavior in
the social sciences. Methodological innovations and improvements of

this sort are not uncommon among legal academics. Looking only
within my family, there is extended, self-conscious attention to methodology in Vicki Been's studies on environmental justice." At the time
of her work, a number of empirical studies showed that communities

surrounding hazardous waste sites were disproportionately populated
by people of color and the poor.4 Been's work examined, for the first
time, whether the disparity is the product of disproportionate siting or
of market dynamics. It posited that the communities surrounding the
'

facility may not have been disproportionately minority or poor at the
time the facility located there. Instead, the demographic composition

might have changed after the facility was sited, as those who could afford to leave the neighborhood and find housing elsewhere did so and
were replaced by individuals seeking cheap housing or barred from

other housing by discrimination."
Been's principal article empirically examining the market dynamics hypothesis dwells extensively on methodological questions.47 It de-

votes considerable effort to choosing the relevant geographic unit surrounding the site, and adopts a sophisticated procedure for dealing
and Eric A. Hanushek, eds, Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions 191, 194
(1995) (listing the operative principles of legal formalism as "consistency, coherence, and stability, rather than any reference to ...external political or economic forces").
43
See Segal, 91 Am Polit Sci Rev at 28 (cited in note 25).
44 See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 Yale L J 1383, 1398-1406 (1994) (evaluating existing
empirical evidence on the relationship between race and locally undesirable land uses and concluding that further research is needed); Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J Land Use & Envir L 1, 8-21 (1995) (pointing out assumptions and methodological
choices that obscure or exaggerate the problems of environmental justice); Vicki Been and Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios?: A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 Ecol L Q 1, 9-19 (1997) (describing the article's empirical methodology that corrects for problems with studies existing at the time).
45
See Been, 103 Yale L J at 1392-97 (cited in note 44).
46 See id at 1384-85.
47 See Been, 24 Ecol L Q at 9-19 (cited in note 44).
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with situations in which the chosen unit-census tracts-changes over
time.48 The article also introduces an important variable-population
density-to control for the possibility that sites are less likely to be located in denser areas. Because data on density was not available for
two of the decades of the study, Been constructed a proxy for that
variable.' Another of her articles is self-consciously devoted, almost
exclusively, to methodological issues.5° Indeed, its stated purpose is "to
highlight the methodological issues researchers need to address, and
to present alternative methodologies that should improve our ability
to understand the nature of the distribution of environmental 'goods'
''..
and 'bads..
Casting only a slightly larger net extending beyond my family, in
an article forthcoming in the Journal of FinancialEconomics2 and
available on the Social Science Research Network 3 since February
2000, my colleague Robert Daines makes a significant methodological
advance that permits him to test whether incorporation in Delaware
increases firm value-a question that scholars have long debated. An
important prior study had examined stock price reactions to the announcement that a firm would reincorporate in Delaware. Because
such changes are often accompanied by changes in business strategy,
however, it is difficult to determine whether the change in price reflects the reincorporation or the change in business practice. Also,
such studies cannot shed light on how the decision to incorporate in a
particular state affects the value of firms that do not reincorporate.
Scholars thus continue to disagree about Delaware's impact on firm
value.
Daines's methodological innovation was to study the effect of incorporation in Delaware on a firm's Tobin's Q-the ratio of a firm's
market value to the replacement cost of its assets-thus allowing him
to examine all public firms and avoid the selection bias and identification problems that affected all prior studies. He finds that the

Id at 10-16.
Id at 23.
Been, 11 J Land Use & Envir L at 4 (cited in note 44).
Id.
Robert Daines, DoesDelawareLaw Improve Firm Value?, 62 J Fin Econ 525 (2001).
53 Robert Daines, Does DelawareLaw Improve Firm Value?, Columbia Law School Center
for Studies in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 159 (2000), available online at
<http:llpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=195109> (visited Jan 11, 2002). The SSRN
database was one of Epstein and King's sources for empirical legal scholarship. See Epstein and
King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 16 & n 39 (cited in note 1).
54 See Roberta Romano, Law as Product Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, 1 J L,
Econ, & Org 225, 268-73 (1985). For a more recent study of this type in finance literature, see
Randall A. Heron and Wilbur G. Lewelen, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the ReincorporationDecision, 33 J Fm & Quant Analysis 549 (1998) (examining the effects of reincorporation in new
states on shareholder wealth and the firm's ability to attract outside directors).
48
49
50
51
52
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Tobin's Q of Delaware firms is higher, thereby supporting the hypothesis that Delaware law improves firm value. Daines shows that
the result is statistically significant and robust to controls for company
size, industry, growth opportunities, diversification, financial performance, and unobservable firm heterogeneity.55 Thus, this method provides the first large-sample evidence of the relationship between law
and firm value.
It may be that I am extraordinarily fortunate to have been able to
spend time with a spouse and colleagues who performed the only empirical studies by legal academics that make important methodological
advances. The far more likely scenario, however, is that a broader review of the legal literature would reveal many such examples. That
Epstein and King could have done an extensive search of the legal literature and found no examples of this kind is therefore far more
damning of the quality of their review than it is of the quality of the
legal literature.
II. MISPLACED CRITICISMS

It is not possible in the space allocated to this Response to examine the validity of all of Epstein and King's complaints about empirical legal scholarship. I will instead focus on their extensive attacks on
my work on judicial behavior in the D.C. Circuit. In particular, they
complain about my choice of proxy for judicial ideology and my coding of the disposition of cases. All of Epstein and King's criticisms are
unwarranted.
It is possible, of course, that they erred only with respect to my article and that their criticisms of the rest of the empirical legal scholarship were well taken. The reader, once again, will have to decide
whether such a scenario is plausible.
A. Choice of Proxy for Judicial Ideology
Epstein and King devote a great deal of energy to attacking my
proxy for judicial ideology-the views generally held by the party of
the appointing president. They concede that this is "surely a reliable
measure" but complain that it is not necessarily a "valid" measure because it does not take into account what they consider to be the important role of senatorial courtesy in determining the composition of
the lower federal courts.' According to Epstein and King, "[this] important institutional feature of the appointment process ...may have

the effect of constraining the President from nominating a candidate

55
56

See Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Finn Value? at *4, *10 (cited in note 53).
Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 83-84 (cited in note 1).
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to the lower federal courts who mirrors his ideology."2 They maintain
that "when a senator is of the same party as the President and the vacancy is from the senator's state, the senator can exert considerable influence on the selection of judges."''
There is one fatal problem with their criticism. My study is of the
D.C. Circuit. The District of Columbia is not (at least for the time being) a state. It does not have any senators. Nobody exercises senatorial
courtesy with respect to appointments to the D.C. Circuit. In fact, one
of the reasons that particular judges get appointed to the D.C. Circuit
as opposed to other courts is to get around the opposition of the senators from their home states. For example, in 1985, President Reagan
abandoned an effort to place James Buckley on the Second Circuit, in
part because of the opposition of Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, where Buckley was a resident and from where he had run
unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate in 1980. Instead, President Reagan
nominated Buckley to the D.C. Circuit.59 It is quite likely that other
nominees get placed on the D.C. Circuit because the senators from
their home states have other ideas about whom they wish to place on
their regional circuits.
But even if my study had been of one of the regional circuits, for
which there are senators who can demand senatorial courtesy, Epstein
and King's criticisms would still be unwarranted. Using the party of
the appointing president as a proxy for ideology is a standard technique in political science studies of judicial behavior. In fact, one recent study reviewed "[o]ne hundred forty books, articles, dissertations,
and conference papers ...in the legal and political science literatures

between 1959 and 1998 reporting empirical research pertinent to a
link between judges' political party affiliation and judicial ideology."
The author notes that "investigations of the federal bench often look
at the party of appointing presidents" instead of the party affiliations
of the judges (which are often difficult to determine). A substantial
proportion of the works reviewed are in the political science literature.3
57
58

Id at 89.
Id at 95.

59 See Michael Oreskes, James Buckley to Be Washington Court Nominee, NY Tunes Al

(Oct 9, 1985) ("Senator Weicker told associates that he felt that Mr. Buckley was not qualified
and that Mr. Buckley, who lives in Connecticut, had not contributed to building the Republican

Party in the state.").
60 See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmakingon US. Courts of

Appeals, 58 Ohio St L J 1635, 1651 (1998) ("[S]ocial scientists have discovered that the political
party of the appointing President is a good proxy for a justice's attitudes.").
61 Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Metaanalysis,20 Just Sys J 219,219 (1999).
62 See idat 222.
63 See id at 243-54 (listing studies).
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Epstein and King may be right that also controlling for the views
of the senators from the appointee's home state might be preferable.

But for this proposition they rely on a study that had not yet been
published," and that was not available even in working paper format
at the time my article was published. Even if the District of Columbia
had senators, it would still be odd to indict my piece for what still is
the state-of-the-art methodology. The standard approach of the social

sciences to a methodological innovation is to perform a new study to
ascertain whether the innovation has an impact on the previous re-

sults, not to excoriate prior studies for not having used it.6
More generally, Epstein and King seem confused about the design of studies of judicial behavior and perhaps for this reason they
complain about my choice of proxy. For example, they note that "the
empirical record demonstrates that the voting propensities of the appointees of some Democratic and Republican presidents do not differ
significantly." They claim, as a result, that the ideology of the appointing president is a bad proxy for judicial ideology. But it could be, instead, that the proxy is good but that judges are not being influenced

by their ideology in deciding cases. Studies of judicial behavior should
choose the best available proxy for judicial ideology, and then test
whether this proxy is correlated with judicial votes. As indicated
above, the standard proxy in the political science literature is determined by reference to the views generally held by the party of the appointing president-that is, the proxy that I have used. Epstein and
King generally prefer a measure derived from newspaper editorials

about Supreme Court nominees. I have indicated in my prior work

64 See Michael Giles, Virginia Hettinger, and Todd Peters, An Alternative Measure of Preferences for Federal Judges, 54 Polit Rsrch Q 623 (2001) (cited in Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L
Rev at 88 n 279,89 n 281,95 nn 301,304 (cited in note 1)).
65
Epstein and King also present my article as an example of the problems that arise "when
researchers have not clearly specified their theory." Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 74
(cited in note 1). As evidence of this methodological malfeasance they quote the following sentences from my article: "'Some commentators have ... maintained that judges simply vote according to their policy preferences. In environmental cases, the allegation goes, judges appointed
by Republican Presidents vote principally for laxer regulations and judges appointed by Democratic Presidents for more stringent regulation."' Id, quoting Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1717 (cited in
note 9). They claim that this passage is ambiguous as to how the independent variable defining a
judge's ideology would be constructed. Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 74-75 (cited in note
1). But those sentences merely purport to summarize the prior literature. The very next sentence
states precisely how I will perform the test: "[by] using as a proxy the views generally held by the
party of the appointing President." Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1718 (cited in note 9). Epstein and
King understand that. See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 75,83,86 (cited in note 1).
66
Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 88 (cited in note 1), citing Giles, Hettinger, and
Peppers, 54 Polit Rsrch Q 623 (cited in note 64).
67
See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 90-91 (cited in note 1) (advocating the measure used in Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of US Supreme Court Justices, 83 Am Polit Sci Rev 557,559 (1989)).
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that "this methodology is unlikely to be usable for court of appeals
judges, whose nominations typically receive less media attention" than
those of Supreme Court justices.68 Epstein and King do not contest my
claim in this regard.6 Instead, they propose a measure, advocated by a
forthcoming study, that takes account of senatorial courtesy. But, as
explained above, such a measure is simply inapplicable to the D.C.
Circuit.
Coding of the Disposition of Cases

B.

Epstein and King also criticize the manner in which I coded the
disposition of cases. They note, "While he tells us that he treats 'remands' as 'reversals,' he does not report how he characterizes" other
dispositions.70In particular, they complain that a researcher attempting
to replicate my study would not know whether to "characterize an 'affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded' as a reversal or an affirmance. 7' They purport not to know how I would have coded such a
case: "Neither the researcher nor we can answer that question because
Revesz does not tell us.""2 In fact, any researcher seeking to replicate
my study would not have any such problem. My published work contains references to both the coding protocol used for my study and to
the notes explaining the manner in which cases were coded, and indicates that these documents are both publicly available from the journal that published my article." In particular, the protocol and accompanying notes make clear that only full affirmances are treated as affirmances.'47
Epstein and King also complain that even if I had been interested
in studying whether cases were affirmed on the one hand, or reversed
or remanded on the other, it would have been better to start with a
more detailed specification of the outcomes. That is precisely what I
did. As they suggest, my coding protocol contains different entries for
"Reverse/Remand" and for "Reverse/Remand in part."76 Also, as they

68 See Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality,and the D.C Circuit:A Reply to Chief
Judge Harry T Edwards,85 Va L Rev 805,824 n 102 (1999).
69 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 88 n 276 (cited in note 1).
70 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 84 (cited in note 1).
71 Id at 86.
72 Id at 85.

73

See Revesz, 85 Va L Rev at 820 n 87 (cited in note 68).

74 See Richard L. Revesz, Notes on the Coding Protocolfor EmpiricalStudy of the D.C
Circuit 4, question 41, cited in Revesz, 85 Va L Rev at 820 n 87 (cited in note 68); Notes on the
Coding Protocolat 5, question 41, cited in id.

75

See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 83-85 (cited in note 1).

76 See Revesz, Notes on the Coding Protocolat 4, question 41, cited in Revesz, 85 Va L Rev

at 820 n 87 (cited in note 68); Notes on the Coding Protocol at 5, question 41, cited in id. The
notes also make clear that "[r]emanded but not reversed" is coded as "remand/reverse."
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would like, it splits cases up into a number of categories, by distinguishing between challenges to a substantive environmental policy
and other cases. ' The accompanying notes indicate that the following
outcomes "were not considered challenges to an EPA environmental
policy ...: 1. non-environmental challenges (attorney fees cases, em-

ployment cases, freedom of information cases, other types of regulations, funding cases); 2. court decisions involving voluntary dismissal
or joint motion; 3. housekeeping motions."'' Both the coding protocol
and the accompanying notes reveal that if a case does not involve a
challenge to a substantive environmental policy, it would not be used
in the statistical analysis. 7 Thus, Epstein and King are simply mistaken
in raising concerns about whether my coding of the disposition of
cases can be replicated, and are also wrong with respect to their quibbles about how I defined the number of possible case dispositions.
III. THE INDICTMENT OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Epstein and King's indictment of legal scholarship exhibits many
of the same methodological failures that they attribute to law professors. First, their call for placing empirical legal scholarship in intellectual receivership, which is the central policy recommendation of their
article,' could be justified only by some comparative evaluation of the
methodological practices of legal and social science scholars. Epstein
and King never attempt such a comparative inquiry.8'
It may well be the case that empirical legal scholarship is in bad
shape. But how do we know that social scientists do not engage in the
same, or other, pitfalls when they write about law-related subjects?
Indeed, in the examples given in Part I of my work, and of Been's and
Daines's work, the literature those studies improved upon was by social scientists. Any well-designed empirical study would have to make
an assessment of practices among social scientists. Indeed, many of the
methodological ills that they attribute to legal scholarship, such as explaining in detail how cases are coded or archiving data in generally
77 See Revesz, Notes on the Coding Protocol at 1, question 9, cited in Revesz, 85 Va L Rev
at 820 n 87 (cited in note 68).
78 Revesz, Notes on the Coding Protocol at 2, question 9, cited in Revesz, 85 Va L Rev at
820 n 87 (cited in note 68). "Housekeeping motions" include requests concerning the filing of
briefs and the time allocated to oral argument.
79 Revesz, Notes on the Coding Protocolat 1, question 9, cited in Revesz, 85 Va L Rev at
820 n 87 (cited in note 68); Revesz, Notes on the Coding Protocolat 2, question 9, cited in id.
80 See text accompanying notes 6-8.
81 They do say in passing that they "do not mean to suggest that empirical research appearing in law reviews is always, or even usually, worse than articles in the journals of other scholarly
disciplines." Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 18 (cited in note 1). But their recommendations make sense only if empirical legal scholarship is, in fact, a great deal poorer than its counterpart in the social sciences.
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accessible repositories, are not exclusive to legal scholarship. First, recall Epstein and King's complaint-unjustified, it turned out-that I
did not explain whether remands in part were treated in the same
manner as remands in full.2 Complications of this type are not dis-

cussed in prominent social science studies, which code cases as prounion or anti-union,0 or liberal or conservative.0
Second, Epstein and King are quite unclear about the scope of

their claim, because the authors criticize articles in a wide variety of
categories. Many of the articles with which they find fault were written

by law professors and published in law reviews; they describe their
empirical design as a "survey of current practices in the nation's law
reviews." But others were written by law professors and published in
peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journals.6 The supposedly poor quality of these pieces cannot be attributable to the editorial practices of
student-run law reviews.0 Moreover, it would be odd if the peerreviewed journals systematically published bad empirical research by
lawyers and good empirical research by social scientists. Yet other
pieces that the authors criticize were coauthored by legal academics

and social scientists." In fact, such collaboration is exactly what Epstein and King prescribe elsewhere in their article: "[L]aw professors
can learn on the job by entering into collaborations with a methodologist in the law school or colleagues with an interest in law in, say,

See text accompanying notes 70-74.
See Spiller and Gely, 23 RAND J Econ at 474 (cited in note 25) (classifying Supreme
Court decisions as "pro-union").
84 See Segal, 91 Am Polit Sci Rev at 36 n 27 (cited in note 25) (defining cases as "liberal");
Caporale and Winter, 35 J Econ Beh & Org at 466 (cited in note 25) (assigning decisions a binary
variable corresponding to whether or not the decision is liberal).
85 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 15 (cited in note 1).
86 Epstein and King indicate that they examined studies in four peer-reviewed journals.
See id at 16.
87 Epstein and King are critical of law reviews and devote considerable attention to suggesting an alternative model of scholarly journal management. See id at 125-30.
88 See id at 39-41 (discussing Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P Garvey, and Martin T.Wells,
Jury Responsibility in CapitalSentencing: An EmpiricalStudy, 44 Buff L Rev 339 (1996)); id at
56-57 (discussing Gregory Sisk, Michael Heise and Andrew Morriss, Charting the Influences on
the JudicialMindAn EmpiricalStudy of JudicialReasoning,73 NYU L Rev 1377 (1998)); id at
52-53 (discussing Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender Work, and Choice:An EmpiricalStudy of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation,59 U
Chi L Rev 1073 (1992)); id at 87-89, 95-96 (discussing Cross and Tiller, 107 Yale L J at 2155
(cited in note 35)). Wells is Professor of Statistics in the Department of Social Statistics at Cornell University. He obtained a Ph.D. in mathematics on the basis of a dissertation on empirical
methodology entitled Contributionsto the Theory of Goodness of Fit Testing. Heise and Morriss
both have Ph.D.s in the social sciences; Morriss is also an associate professor of economics at
Case Western Reserve University. Petterson was a doctoral candidate in sociology at the time the
article was written, and later became an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Virginia. Tiller has a Ph.D. in the social sciences and holds an academic appointment at the University of Texas Business School.
82
83
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one of the social sciences." If this model does not work either, why
should we expect that Epstein and King's solution of placing legal
scholarship in intellectual receivership will be more successful? One
of the articles criticized as an example of poor legal scholarship was
written by one of the nation's leading empirical social scientists, who
does not have a law degree.9°
More generally, because Epstein and King never explain how
they define the universe of works that they evaluate, their study suffers from the same types of replication problems that they attribute to
legal scholarship: other researchers would simply not know what
works Epstein and King considered.9 '
Third, the Epstein and King study suffers from another serious
replication problem: it never explains with any clarity what it means
by lack of "self-conscious attention to methodology"92 -one of the primary evils that it attributes to legal scholarship. As a result, it is likely
that if other researchers tried to replicate the study, they would not
use the same metric. Rather, to use Epstein and King's own phrase in
indicting other scholarship, the researcher "would have to make a
judgment call ... [that] detracts from the reliability of [the] measure.' "9

For example, I believe that my article on judicial behavior on the
D.C. Circuit, which is discussed in Part I, is "self-conscious" as to
methodology, and presents a detailed analysis for why this is so. Epstein and King evidently believe otherwise. The fault lies with the
cavalier manner in which they formulate their indictment of empirical
legal scholarship. In summary, their work suffers from precisely the
same flaws that they attribute to empirical legal scholarship: They "ignore[ ] the rules of inference and appl[y] instead the 'rules' of persuasion and advocacy," even when the goals "[are] to learn about the empirical world."
IV. INTERDISCIPLINARY DIALOGUE

Epstein and King present a picture in which legal scholars do
their work in isolation from their counterparts in the social sciences
and suffer greatly from this lack of dialogue.9' One of their main prescriptions is that legal scholars doing empirical work spend more time
talking to social scientists.
89

Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 120 (cited in note 1).

See id at 77 n 254, discussing W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages
against Corporationsin Environmental and Safety Torts,87 Georgetown L J 285 (1998).
90

91 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 38-45 (cited in note 1) (discussing replication).
92 Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 11 (cited in note 1).
93 Id at 85.
94 Id at 9.
95 See id at 45-48.
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Epstein and King's proposition concerning the desirability of interdisciplinary dialogue is certainly well taken. They are right that legal scholars clearly benefit from such dialogue, although, for reasons
already discussed, they are wrong in believing that, with respect to
empirical methodology, the benefits would flow in only one direction.9
But a world in which legal scholars operate in a vacuum, isolated from
their social science counterparts, is not one that successful legal scholars would find recognizable. The institutions that Epstein and King
would like to create already exist, and are flourishing. I will proceed in
a somewhat autobiographical manner by focusing on those institutions from which I derive principal benefits.
First, I am fortunate that my home institution, the New York
University School of Law, has an ongoing Colloquium on Law, Economics, and Politics, which meets biweekly throughout the academic
year. The colloquium is run by John Ferejohn, of the Political Science
Department and Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and my
colleague Lewis Kornhauser, who has a Ph.D. in economics as well as
a law degree. It is attended on a regular basis by a number of my colleagues on the law faculty as well as by distinguished political scientists from NYU and elsewhere.
Second, in recent years, the annual meeting of the American Law
and Economics Association has included a panel on Positive Political
Theory. The panel organizer has generally been a political scientist
and the presenters have been both legal and social science scholars.
Third, a major conference on the Economics of Courts held at
Harvard University in 1997 brought together leading scholars in law,
economics, and political science doing empirical and theoretical work
on judicial behavior. The hallway conversation at that meeting was
partly about the gradual emergence of a single community of individuals working on similar issues in different parts of the university,
and the increasing synergies resulting from such work.
Fourth, the Journalof Law, Economics, & Organization,edited by
Alan Schwartz of the Yale Law School, serves as a critically important
outlet for work on judicial behavior. Over the years, it has published
the proceedings of two influential conferences on political institutions,9' as well as a number of the leading articles on judicial behavior
by legal and social science academics.n
96 See id at 119-21. They note, for example, that perhaps law schools "could hold a monthly
seminar on applications and innovations in empirical methodology, inviting prominent scholars
(for now,from other disciplines) to lead them." Id at 121 (emphasis added).
97 See Conference on the Economics and PoliticsofAdministrative Law and Procedures,8 J
L, Econ, & Org (1992); Conference on The Organization of Political Institutions, 6 J L, Econ, &
Org (1990).
98 See, for example, Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright, and Christopher J.W. Zorn, So-
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My experience certainly is not unique. A number of my corporate
law colleagues, for example, regularly interact with finance scholars in
economics departments and business schools. They have created vigorous and successful institutions to sustain and encourage such debate.
Interdisciplinary annual meetings that regularly draw a substantial

number of legal and social science academics include those organized
by the American Law and Economics Association, the Law and Soci-

ety Association, and the Public Choice Society. Moreover, as Epstein
and King recognize, there are a number of interdisciplinary peerreviewed journals in which both legal and social science academics
publish their work.9
Epstein and King appear to have simply missed what may be the
most important intellectual development in legal scholarship in the
last couple of decades: its gradual integration with other parts of the

academy.
CONCLUSION
Epstein and King are right about some of the criticisms that they
level against the institutions of legal scholarship. Undoubtedly, some

empirical studies are poorly designed and executed. In general, law
professors do not have access to a stable cadre of student assistants

well trained in empirical methodology. Some law professors may work
in an excessively insulated environment and do not benefit from necessary collegial interactions with social scientists. Most student editors

on law reviews are probably not well equipped to judge whether empirical studies were well conducted-though they might be able to
judge the importance of the question being examined.
But, at the same time, empirical legal scholarship has a great deal

to contribute to the understanding of law and legal institutions, and
social scientists would benefit from paying close attention to the

methodological innovations performed by legal scholars. Because of

phisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J L, Econ, & Org 549 (1999) (ana-

lyzing the "sophisticated voting" of the Supreme Court through a combination of social science
and legal techniques); Pablo T. Spiller and Matthew L. Spitzer, Where Is the Sin in Sincere?: Sophisticated Manipulation of Sincere Judicial Voters (with Applications to Other Voting Environ-

ments), 11 J L, Econ, & Org 32 (1995) (combining traditional "sophisticated voting" models with
a "sincere voting" model to evaluate judicial decisionmaking); Edward R Schwartz, Policy,
Precedent, and Power: A Positive Theory of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 8 J L, Econ, & Org

219 (1992) (using a combination of legal and social science techniques to create a model of Supreme Court decisionmaking that accounts for both policy preferences and precedent); Rafael
Gely and Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with

Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J L, Econ, & Org 263 (1990) (developing
a rational choice theory of the Supreme Court by combining the rational choice model with the
notion that institutions matter in the design of public policy).
99 See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 16 (cited in note 1).
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their flawed methodology and unwarranted criticisms and exaggerations, Epstein and King have missed an important opportunity to examine what legal and social science empirical scholarship can learn
from one another.

